funding for the nation’s costly higher education system that, in their view, has become synonymous with the scourge of “big government” itself. To understand how this happened requires an examination of not only Gross’s conservative moralizers but, more important, how their elected counterparts at every level of government have gained and wielded political power by running against the liberal educational establishment whose origins Gross so brilliantly describes.


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In Fallout, Gregoire Mallard examines an important and understudied issue: the origins of the complex of rules that make up the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Scholars of international institutions tend to eschew hard security issues in favor of areas where international law has a firmer basis, such as international trade and finance, while students of nuclear issues often overlook institutions in order to study the strategic dynamics of nuclear deterrence and proliferation. The nuclear nonproliferation regime is, however, one arena where international institutions and high politics undoubtedly come together, and in this thoughtful and well-researched book, Mallard has the good sense to make it his field of study.

Mallard’s theorizing goes beyond nuclear issues, however, to boldly develop a broader theoretical framework for addressing the design and consequences of international institutions writ large, asking why diplomats variously prefer the use of transparency and ambiguity in the design of treaty rules and, in turn, the effect of transparent versus ambiguous rules on the subsequent strength and coherence of an international legal order over time.

In this sense, Mallard’s work draws on the rational design school in political science (and the book could have benefited from a deeper and more consistent engagement with this literature), but he takes the basic insights from this school in innovative directions, including developing the concept of “opaque” treaty rules, which Mallard defines as those with a secret meaning that is known only to diplomats and insiders and a second public interpretation that is formally announced. Mallard convincingly shows that this category of rules is especially relevant for nuclear negotiations in which accords on “peaceful” nuclear programs often conceal secret military intentions.

The hypothesized causes and effects of transparent, ambiguous, and opaque treaty rules are complex, but a key insight of the book is that ambiguous and opaque rules allow diplomats to find areas of agreement and strike deals that would not otherwise be possible but that a lack of transparency can lead to complications for the strength and durability of agreements over time.
Mallard illustrates his arguments with a series of case studies on some of the most important institutions (and proposed institutions) of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. He shows how the Truman administration’s insistence on transparent treaty rules doomed the Baruch Plan for a worldwide ban on nuclear weapons in the early nuclear era. Ambiguous text almost facilitated the conclusion of a European Defense Community Treaty in the 1950s that would have regulated the production of nuclear energy in Europe, but it was killed when preemptive national interpretations rung ambiguity out of the text, closing room for agreement.

In perhaps the most compelling chapter in the book, Mallard argues that opaque rules were necessary for the successful conclusion of the Euratom Treaty in 1957 and the United States–Euratom treaty in 1958, as the U.S. Congress believed it was signing off on strict nonproliferation accords, while European states secretly interpreted the same text as granting rights to nuclear weapons development. Scholars and analysts should keep the lessons of this case in mind as the international community rushes to strike a deal with Iran over its disputed nuclear program.

Throughout the book, the historical work is thorough, informative, and engaging. The story of how the harmonization of Euratom and International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear controls contributed to the institutionalization of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, is fascinating and not well known, even to experts.

At times, however, the author places undue emphasis on his preferred account. Perhaps, for example, agreements on a global nuclear weapons ban or for a common European defense treaty were simply impossible because state interests did not align. If so, then treaty language had little to do with the outcome. Unfortunately, the book never explicitly considers this or other alternative explanations.

In the final chapter, Mallard fast-forwards to the present and examines the countries that have remained forever outside the nuclear nonproliferation regime (Israel, India, and Pakistan), the problematic states that are contravening its norms today (Iran and North Korea), and those that have done so in the recent past (Iraq and Libya). Mallard asks how we got to this point and what, if anything, can be done to bring these countries into compliance.

Among other explanations, the author attributes much blame to the United States for permitting these countries to subvert the global nonproliferation order, but in so doing he risks confusing a lack of omnipotence with complicity. After all, Washington took concrete steps to keep each of these countries from the bomb. In some cases, it succeeded, and in others it failed, despite its efforts.

Still, while one may disagree with his diagnosis, Mallard’s proposed solution for addressing these nonproliferation challenges is no doubt original and consistent with the book’s overall argument. Just as Euratom served as a basis from which to fold the nations of Europe into the NPT, outlier states’ preexisting legal commitments may be the key for harmonization with the
nonproliferation regime and, ultimately, for bringing these countries back into the family of nations. Let us hope he is correct.

*How Organizations Develop Activists: Civic Associations and Leadership in the 21st Century.* By Hahrie Han. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xvi+231. $99.00 (cloth); $27.95 (paper).

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Most strategic players at one time or another face what I call the extension dilemma: How large should your team or organization be? Too small and you have no impact on the world around you. Too large and the components are hard to control and disagreements and factions emerge. Corporate fashions, for instance, tend to swing over time between sprawling conglomerates and more tightly focused attention to core businesses. Protest groups must decide how much time and energy to devote to recruiting new members or to pleasing and motivating the ones they already have. The process of expansion can itself be painful and often requires extensive resources that may or may not pay off.

Political scientist Hahrie Han implicitly addresses the extension dilemma in her crisp new book, *How Organizations Develop Activists*, by comparing three ideal-types of activism in civic associations. At one extreme are lone wolves who operate largely as individuals, even though they depend on the names and stationery of organizations. They develop expertise over time, even if they have no special technical training, simply by learning about topics; they often criticize proposals in great detail in public hearings and other comment opportunities. At the opposite extreme are the mobilizers, who use media (especially in today’s world, the Internet) to get out large numbers of people for specific events, notably rallies and meetings. These numbers matter most to them, and they do not necessarily know their recruits personally.

Seemingly in between the one and the many is a third type, organizers, who devote intense efforts to building new leaders who will share their work. They do not try to reach the mass audiences that mobilizers hope for, for they could not interact so intensively with large numbers. I say seemingly, however, because successful organizing may eventually be able to mobilize large numbers via the networks it painstakingly creates. These three types of leaders are familiar categories, and the contrast between organizing and mobilizing has been subject to intense recent debates, for instance, in the work of the sociologist Jane McAlevey, who argues firmly for organizing potential union members, not mobilizing them. Scholars like Robert Putnam and Theda Skocpol perceive a disturbing historical shift from organizing to mobilizing.