Fallout: nuclear diplomacy in an age of global fracture

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Ulysses and the Nuclear Diplomats

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Grégoire Mallard’s *Fallout: Nuclear Diplomacy in an Age of Global Fracture* is a strikingly original book, one that opens important intellectual terrain for historical and global/transnational sociology. Its subject is the genesis and development of the regulated field of global nuclear non-proliferation. I read the book for the first time last autumn, but its revealing arguments have been echoing in my ears throughout the recent multilateral negotiations between Iran and the United States.

The 1968 signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the subsequent adherence of some but not all signatory states are major subjects of the book. Technical as it is at times, the book is also a literary pleasure, suggesting a substitution of Homeric metaphors as a starting point for a fresh sociological analysis of these crucial outcomes. For the tale of Ulysses and the sirens is still the dominant metaphor through which academics, at least, grasp how high-stakes treaties are forged. Readers will remember the classical story. As Ulysses charts his course off Circe’s island, she warns him that the Sirens’ song is so irresistible to sailors that it will lure him and his crew to their deaths. Ulysses has his crew block their ears but leave his open. He orders his men to tie him to the ship’s mast, and to ignore whatever he says while he is under the sirens’ spell.

The ‘Ulysses strategy’ includes both his pre-commitment (binding himself to a course of action against future desires that would lead to his own and collective perdition) and the decision to block out any further information, persuasion or drift that might detach them all from the chosen course of action. The canny actor, therefore, renounces sovereignty over self in aid of future more perfect sovereignty … and of staying alive. Note that the strategy also includes coercion (the bonds), applied in part to self, to back up the agreement. So first there is the lead up to the signing of the treaty. Once the deal is made, and the regime is put in place, the terms must be such as to hold all signatories to their word. The fateful agreement among disputants, issuing in a Leviathan who/which can hold everyone accountable to that agreement, is the two-step Hobbesian version of Homer’s tale. This at
least is my reading of the typical metaphor, channeled through the lens of social science history.

But when applied to states signing and adherence to the NPT, Gregoire Mallard sees this powerful metaphor as an overly limiting one (p. 39), part and parcel of typical but inadequate conceptions of international law. The metaphor and attendant analysis assume that states (or their representatives) make calculations outside a preexisting legal context, as if people, like Ulysses, actually had their hands free before signing the treaty. He prefers Penelope to Ulysses as a model. New treaties are “new knots” that “Penelope adds to her canvas in order to keep her pretenders at bay until Ulysses’ return ... or, as far as today’s international law professionals are concerned, to buy time in order to prevent challengers from subverting the rights and privileges that their state secured in past treaties.” (40)

In this vision of things, successive treaty regimes take center stage. Change takes place as state actors – overlapping groups of representatives of nation-states jockeying for position at the bargaining table – appear and recede. So, for example, Mallard examines how Israel, India and Pakistan are part of separate regimes that preceded the NPT moment. They simply could not be “easily convinced to tie their hands to the central mast of the NPT regime through persuasion and coercion.” (40) The question becomes not why there is legal order instead of anarchy, but how legal change occurs among successive treaty regimes. What matters is “who ties the new knots and how the new knots find their place in a general pattern” (ibid.). This is a refreshing approach to legal regimes. What these existing, overlapping regimes are – how they came to be – and how they might be harmonized in service of something as important as our collective survival are therefore the key intellectual and policy questions that come to the fore.

**Fallout’s most exciting innovation is the emphasis on ambiguity and opacity as a key strategy that actors adopt in international affairs.**

*Fallout’s* most exciting innovation is the emphasis on ambiguity and opacity as a key strategy that actors adopt in international affairs. Players, who are professionals acting on behalf of nation states, intervene legally in context-dependent ways. Insiders, who share a clear but private understanding of the treaty, have a different stance than the outsiders who also believe that they command the legal terrain. This asymmetry between public and private meanings makes it possible for certain professionals to strategize autonomously, because they are able to maintain two simultaneous truths. Thus a treaty may be secretly aimed at accomplishing some outcome that it publicly disavows. Some understand, make use of, and strategize to maintain that particular vagueness and therefore room to maneuver. No wonder Penelope is a touchstone here.

A critical historical example is detailed in Mallard’s chapter on Israel, India, Pakistan – and the ways that the U.S. and Western European governments deliberately worked to keep the nuclear status of these three countries opaque. They were able to do so until recently. Regarding Israel, what may have begun as an emergency measure became a half-century history of non-transparency, only now eroded. As for India, the U.S. and Europe tried to maintain opacity in order to (vainly) reconcile India’s nuclear behavior with the rules of the global nuclear game. The West’s tactic of opacity vis-à-vis Pakistan’s nuclear nonproliferation regime has been even less
successful, however: it undermined the whole nuclear proliferation treaty. In the face of this threat to the entire system, the challenge to ‘harmonize’ has become increasingly pressing.

This is sharply emphasized at the present historical moment, to extend Mallard’s account, as the United States and Iran attempt to establish that as two equals, that they can forge a private understanding that, eventually, yes, Iran will become a nuclear power… but not just yet. The outward opacity in this set of communications seeks to insure not only that dissident internal decision-makers are neutralized, but that Israel in particular is incorporated in the public but not the private understanding. What makes things yet more complicated is that the prospect of the ultimate terms, and their manipulation, influences the negotiators who are making the initial deal, and attempting to formulate terms to which people can finally adhere.

I have three brief comments and questions – on sovereignty and agency; method, and the profession of diplomacy – and advance them in reverse order.

First, the profession of diplomacy is changing. It is qualitatively harder to maintain secrecy or opacity than it used to be. In part this is due to the erosion of old boys’ diplomatic clubs, though the rise of technology (including social media) has also played a part. Diplomats in Europe, more than in the United States, for example, tweet with relative freedom and enjoy a lot of latitude in what they can discuss, and their latitude is complemented by the rise of actors invested in dramatic political exposures (WikiLeaks, Snowden, etc.). These trends undermine professionals’ capacity to maintain two truths simultaneously to achieve their vision of balance in service (they think) of national/international interests. What are the implications for the practice of diplomacy and more particularly for nuclear proliferation going forward? Diplomats themselves comment on these very tensions; they would seem to be significantly disruptive of the current modus operandi.

With respect to method, the trade-off here is between an emphasis on connections and comparison. Perhaps this is an indelible tension in historical sociology and social science history. In Fallout, we see it in the emphasis on type concepts and comparison in the more theoretical parts of the text, and the more connected narrative of the empirical story. Because of this, I think that the book may be interpreted in quite different ways depending on the readers’ methodological predilections. Some will see it as a sensitizing narrative that emphasizes the role of actors’ strategic use of polysemy and public/private spaces in service of constructed tactical goals. Others will construe it as introducing a new variable in service of better explanation of why states do or don’t sign onto nuclear proliferation treaties/why shared nuclear regimes survive or don’t. Either interpretation seems sustainable to me on the basis of the text, but I wonder what Mallard himself thinks.

Finally, a concluding word concerning agency in the present moment of sovereign power and imperial crisis. We are living in the midst of an era of greatly accentuated international tensions, and the rise of inter-imperial and inter-state rivalries, typical of a period in which there is no hegemonic equilibrium. Executive power is concentrated and the role of the sovereign, of sovereign powers plural, simultaneously heightened and undermined, as George Steinmetz and I (2015) have recently argued in an article in Political Power and Social Theory. Agency or action "on behalf of..." will always have a foundational place in the projection of sovereign power, but in a context of troubled sovereignty, enormous diplomatic challenges come to the fore. What is the place
of international treaties – and the particular nuclear non-proliferation regime - in this increasingly unstable and decentred reality, in the “age of global fracture”? What is the role for diplomacy, for diplomats themselves?

We know that Fallout does not conceptualize states as fictive individuals, caught in a bad equilibrium of a war of all against all, that then collectively decide, in service of their concatenated self-interest, to surrender their swords to a Leviathan exemplified in an international treaty that will enforce upon them peace such that all might thrive. Yet a signal virtue of even the most rationalistic interpretation of the Ulysses metaphor, as in the Hobbesian state, is that they capture the distributed nature of agency – Ulysses is equipped by Circe to survive the sirens; Ulysses needs his sailors to bind him; Penelope maintains Ulysses’ realm on his and her son’s behalf while he is en route, etc. – and the ever-present opening to agency problems that such a distribution necessarily involves. The problems of agents-become-principals; of multiple principals, etc., are a key part of the narrative in Fallout, but I don’t believe that they are adequately captured in the theory. Yet they loom larger than ever in today’s diplomatic enterprises and nuclear negotiations.

So there is a lot to learn from, and a lot to argue with, in Fallout: Nuclear Diplomacy in an Age of Global Fracture. Grégoire Mallard has written a wonderful, stimulating work, and I trust that historical social scientists and social science historians will be grappling with it productively for years to come.

References


Review of Fallout

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On April 2, 2015, Bloomberg Business reported on the Iran nuclear negotiations with the headline Iran Negotiators Discuss Secret Annex as Talks Near Agreement (Viscusi, Tirone, & Lakshmanan, 2015). As the article went on to indicate, this would allow diplomats to decouple international and domestic politics, all within the context of legally circumscribed negotiations. “Such a document,” diplomats indicated, “would help U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to persuade Congressional skeptics that tangible progress had been made, while Iranian leaders would also have something to show to domestic hardliners.”

It is precisely this sort of intrigue, tension, and points of complicity between diplomacy and law, and between the domestic and the international, that are at the heart of Grégoire Mallard’s book Fallout: Nuclear Diplomacy in an Age of Global Fracture. In it, Mallard provides us with an empirically sophisticated and theoretically nuanced account of law, diplomacy, and international coordination — and along the way, an account of individual norm entrepreneurs, of national politics, and of the power of legal texts (perhaps! I return to this below) — all on the terrain of one of the most trenchant issues of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, namely the world of nuclear diplomacy. Indeed, while foregrounding an exciting set of battles over legal treaties and diplomatic pressures, Grégoire Mallard’s book also offers a broad conceptual model for understanding how diplomatic pressures and international legal agreements take different forms, and how these affect the stability, effectiveness, and transparency of international “law” itself.
As a sociology of diplomacy and law, Mallard’s choice of case study is ingenious. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is not only one of the most important treaties for global security (and with continued relevance in current events); Mallard also demonstrates that the decades of negotiation that led to the Treaty, and the years following its signing, were among the most exciting and politically embroiled of the twentieth century. The reader is thus kept in rapt attention as we follow the negotiations through changes in US administrations and elite politics over time, through the role of powerful institutions such as the Ford Foundation, Harvard University, or RAND, through the Eurofederalists in France and beyond, and all the while analyzing the social skill, embeddedness, and position-taking of powerful players such as Jean Monnet and Henry Stimson.

Beyond this, Mallard’s choice of method allows him to break new methodological and conceptual ground in the sociology of international law. He is able to combine attention and faithfulness to legal texts (in this case, the writing of international treaties) with attention to the social position of those who negotiate and write them. In so doing, he avoids being ensnared in textism while also evading the parallel trap of ignoring the power of legal form. But the book does more than bridge these traditions. Instead, Mallard relies on nuclear nonproliferation treaties to produce a taxonomy of legal texts as being “transparent,” “ambiguous,” or purposefully “opaque.” In Mallard’s typology, however, these are not merely adjectives that speak to the clarity of legal language; these instead represent types of treaties that, depending on the social positions and strategic needs of diplomats, allow them to overcome trust problems, to encourage or forestall the likelihood of a successful agreement, to control the likely timing of an agreement (and postpone the reconciliation of disagreements), and which provide varying opportunities to impose sanctions on wrongdoers.

Mallard draws on this taxonomy to understand, for example, why transparent treaties may emphasize fairness, but may run against the interests of domestic states to commit themselves to sign; why ambiguous treaties are more tempting for states to sign, but their meaning can easily slip and be overtaken with time and by attacks from newcomers who may choose to reinterpret in a new light; and why opaque treaties, in which the true interpretation of the treaty is kept a secret, may be the least stable forms of agreements when domestic politics change.

In the process, Mallard provides sharp insights not only into the form of these treaties, but maps out who invested in these treaties and legal approaches. American Nationalists of the 1940s, for example, pushed for transparency and public diplomacy in order to, ironically, prevent a deal with the Soviets. Because public transparency makes it difficult to overcome trust problems between states, Southern elites were able to draw in the network of US
Congress to deflect the capacity of US-based cosmopolitan scientists, along with Harvard-trained lawyers and liberal internationalists (such as Henry Stimson, who many may recognize from the creation of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg), to negotiate with the Soviets or create worldwide cooperation. With a turn in the US toward a quantitative and model-based expertise built at RAND to justify a nationalist policy of centralized control (with a correlative increase in influence of the Department of Government at Harvard), the Eurofederalists of the 1950s, such as Jean Monnet, invested ever more in opacity for nuclear agreements, so that the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) could publicly fit the needs of US senators while leaving the determination of peaceful versus military activities to be decided secretly. Importantly, Mallard here trenchantly understands the state—within the US or across Europe—as an inherently competitive space, and the international field as one that reflects and provides fodder for these domestic palace wars (Dezalay & Garth, 2002).

Some may note that these features are limited to international treaties, and ask whether this taxonomy is transportable to other areas of law, such as domestic contracts. Yet the insight of Mallard’s taxonomy, in my view, is not in its replicability across legal fields. Instead, Mallard here provides us with evidence that the very form of a legal agreement varies based on the positions and position-takings of the agents signing it, rather than a constraint on their behavior. Each of these formats then carry their own effects. In so doing, Mallard provides an analysis of the strength of international law that combines a Bourdieusian understanding of the social positions of agents and the field in which they operate, a Latourian sensibility of how texts such as treaties are part of weaving together an international sphere, and a hermeneutic attention to the degree of openness of legal interpretation in international politics, including in the often neglected work of homonyms in allowing treaties to be part of diplomatic and legal double games.

What, then, is the relationship in Fallout between law and diplomacy?

First, for Mallard, these tools point to recursive cycles of legal change in this field over time, though I would argue that many of these events, such as the Suez crisis of 1956, were so trenchant as to lead to new classificatory understandings and struggles that would have broken the stakes and presumptions of earlier diplomatic moves. Understanding the role of events—in the way that Bill Sewell (1996) encourages in his understanding of the taking of the Bastille, namely as ruptures of practices that dislocate and transform existing cycles—would undercut this view of the power of international law, and engage a less complacent interpretation of its use. The Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal did, to be sure, change the course of the French position vis-à-vis a nuclear association with West Germany; but it also requires an understanding of change that extends beyond legal recursivity, to grapple with moral sentiment and national identities in the post-World War II era. This was a highly emotional period, and the tone among leaders—and if it included a changing perception of the Egyptians, it also heightened anxieties over identity and social position for the French themselves (and for the British (Brown, 2001)). The same is true for the launching of Sputnik a year later. To embed these accounts in a model of interpretive legal recursivity tends to downplay the sheer disorienting quality of these highly emotive events of rupture with past categories, and the attempt by diplomats to catch up to them—whatever the legal form may be.
Second, and relatedly, while highlighting the ways in which legal techniques are used by diplomats, Mallard tends to recess the professional differentiation between these two fields that peeks through his narrative of nuclear diplomacy. Through this lens, pace Mallard, law does not enjoy the pride of place that *Fallout* identifies. The field of nuclear nonproliferation is instead suffused with the strategies and position-takings of diplomats. International law and lawyers are integrated where needed to this game, largely through a Machiavellian use of law and language to allow for treaties to be concluded. Perhaps the ambiguity and opacity of diplomatic technique is doing another layer of work here; legal agreements appear to be central to understanding international political agreements, but only if we in turn appreciate that these legal agreements fall onto the terrain and into the purview of diplomats and their moves.

In Bourdieu’s recent book *Sur l’État* (2012) there is a reinforcement of the role of language in understanding legal authority that one finds in Mallard’s book. Jurists, in this vision, enjoy a capital of words and concepts. Yet building from a Kabyle saying that “every rule has its door,” Bourdieu posits that jurists’ authority comes from their capacity to state, within the language of the rule, its very transgression. In the context of nuclear nonproliferation, perhaps Mallard’s empirical account demonstrates that the holders of this capital may not be lawyers but diplomats—and that they hold the key to unlocking the door for each rule, and that they in turn also know where they have hidden those very keys. Either way, this Maussian-like analysis lies at the core of Mallard’s tour de force, a mesmerizing book that is chockablock with intrigue and world politics, while laying out the interrelationships and irreducibilities of law and diplomacy as the most significant claims to authority in global affairs.

References


Comments on *Fallout*

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*Fallout*’s historical investigation into nuclear diplomacy offers the kind of carefully crafted empirical examination that gives historical sociologists a good name among both sociologists and historians. Similarly, the book’s theoretical framing is a fruitful combination of sociology of law and global sociology, mixed with the politics of Bourdieu and the hermeneutics of legal scholarship, leading to insightful arguments. It follows the steps of the by now classical works in the socio-legal tradition of Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth (1996) on the one hand and the work of Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers (2009) on global lawmaking on the other.

*Fallout* offers a novel interpretation of nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy after the Second World War, that concentrates on the US and Europe, but includes brief examinations of the cases of Israel, India and Pakistan. Based on that history, the book makes three arguments regarding international negotiations more
generally.

First, all international negotiations fall into one of three types: those that are transparent, those that are ambiguous, and those that are opaque. The first two kinds of agreements have already been identified and analyzed in the literature, but the third kind – that of opacity – was not. The notion of opacity in international diplomacy is one (although not only) of the main analytical contributions of the book.

Second, *Fallout* identifies the conditions under which each type of agreement – transparency, ambiguity or opacity – is the likely outcome of negotiations. Based on the three main negotiations examined in the book, Mallard suggests that transparency is used to kill the possibility of reaching an agreement; ambiguity is used to avoid exactly those difficulties that stem out of the expectation for transparency; and opacity, too, is used to bypass the challenge of transparency, by seeming transparent while having secret agreements that contradict and undermine those public agreements.

Finally, *Fallout* analyzes the consequences of transparency, ambiguity and opacity. Surprisingly, all three failed to achieve successful agreements. In the first case, calls for transparency made it impossible to reach an agreement; in the second case, ambiguity led to some significant drawbacks in the way the treaty was interpreted; and opacity allowed a new generation of diplomats in the US to more or less ignore the private agreements that had been originally achieved. Opacity has also played an important role in the ability of Israel, India and Pakistan to not play by the rules.

What do we gain from this categorization of international agreements? When Robert Merton, back in 1949, called for middle-range theories to replace general theories of social systems, he was quite adamant about their need to be useful. He distinguished between those concepts or empirical insights that are just descriptive and those that are not. And we know that a concept or an empirical insight is not just descriptive but useful, he wrote, when it brings to the fore questions we could not have asked otherwise. The distinction between transparency, ambiguity and opacity – and, more broadly, the analysis of how international agreements are written, not only who writes them – does that. That is, it brings to the fore questions we could not have asked otherwise.

Let me suggest a few examples for the kind of questions and analytical insights that emerge once we employ Mallard’s terms for thinking about international negotiations.

- One could argue that how agreements are written could be easily reduced to who wrote them. Mallard does not address this question explicitly and his analysis, which assumes actors who are strategic and rational, might not allow him to make such a distinction (more on that below). Nevertheless, if how agreements are written should be analyzed independently of who wrote them – then it brings an entirely new way of thinking about international agreements and their consequences. Most generally, as Mallard mentions but doesn’t emphasize, it invites us to investigate internal features (e.g., content of law) rather than external factors (e.g., who negotiates), or at least an interplay between the two. For a field that is exceptionally sensitive to power, this is indeed quite a revolutionary and fruitful way of thinking about international negotiations.

- Even when considering external factors, once we think about how agreements are written, our concept of power is likely to change, particularly compared to neo-realists’ view. Taking seriously the formulation of agreements may provide, for example, a more nuanced understanding of groups’ relative influence, including not only the influence of state actors
(who are the ones mostly emphasized in *Fallout*) but also of non-state actors. We can consider, for example, the role of international organizations (IOs), and how IO officials can be influential through their work on drafting and redrafting agreements. NGOs’ influence could be understood in a similar way. To make clear, it’s not always easy to distinguish this from other forms of influence. Often, the ability to formulate proposals could be reduced to other forms of capital – for example, the richer an NGO is the better its lawyers are likely to be. Nevertheless, the focus on content does provide new insights into what’s going on behind the scenes and allows for new questions and inquiries.

- The emphasis on how agreements are written also opens new ways of thinking about the relations between international formulations and domestic implementation. Sociologists often think about this question in terms of “decoupling,” which allows for differentiation only along one dimension (Meyer et al. 1997). Halliday and Carruthers (2009), in turn, describe recursive cycles, in which international formulations are altered in the process of implementation at the domestic level and then travel back to the transnational level and causes changes at that level as well. The concepts of transparency, ambiguity and opacity could help us address questions regarding the conditions under which some forms of recursive cycles happen. In identifying those conditions we could rely, as Mallard suggests, on the internal logic of agreements rather than external conditions.

*Fallout* is not only useful, but also insightful, while still, inevitably, leaving some important questions open. Maybe more centrally, is the question of the mechanisms of power. *Fallout* is surprisingly ambiguous in addressing the relations between how agreements are written and who wrote them. On the one hand, this book could in fact be interpreted as confirming the neo-realist approach (using Bourdieu’s theory of fields to analyze domestic processes undermines neo-realisits’ vision of a unified national position – but not their assumption that powerful states would prevail in negotiations); on the other hand, it provides numerous instances that show the independent role of content. The stakes are high – if the degree of transparency, ambiguity and/or opacity is a mere reflection of power dynamics between the negotiating states then it becomes merely a mechanism (it allows us to explain how, for example, those with power were able to kill an international agreement desired by others) rather than an independent factor (that allows us to explain why an international agreement failed to materialize).

At the same time, it is important to note that one of the novelties of Mallard’s analysis is his interest in the doings of specific individuals (diplomats, but also others) more than in the neorealist unit of analysis of (unified) states. Indeed, it offers a useful follow-up for Robert Putnam’s notion of the two-level game (Putnam 1988), with a twist. Putnam’s two-level game offered an alternative to the tendency of political scientists, especially at the time, to reduce every outcome either to international negotiations or to domestic politics. Instead, Putnam suggested a model of
two-leveled negotiations, where at the domestic level, diplomats have to respond to domestic demands; at the international level, they have to respond to the demands of other countries. Interestingly, Putnam works under the assumption that all agreements are transparent. One of the contributions of *Fallout* is to suggest instead that diplomats – that is, those who are torn between the need to reach an international agreement and to address domestic concerns – can manipulate their audiences.

Thinking about *Fallout* as an example of a two-level game reminds us that the analysis here – like most other sociological analyses – assumes actors who are strategic, rational players, and assumes outcomes (here, whether the agreement ends up being transparent, ambiguous or opaque) that are the result of these strategic, rational choices. But this assumption is not entirely compatible, in fact, with the literature on hermeneutics in law that *Fallout* also relies on. For Mallard, as for Putnam, the diplomats are strategic actors who are able to control quite effectively the level of ambiguity in the texts they formulate. This is certainly true in some cases. It is easy to find examples in which legal terms are introduced into international agreements with the tacit understanding that either no one knows what they actually mean or that different parties of the agreement hold a very different view of what they mean. But isn’t ambiguity always the result, even when not intended? This is, after all, a central insight of hermeneutics in law; it is one of the core elements in critical legal studies. The scholarship interested in interpretation of law is particularly sensitive to the inherent inability of law to be clear. As Mallard mentions in the book, according to that literature there isn’t supposed to be a law that is clear. This highlights a potentially irreconcilable tension in the book. After all, why would intended ambiguity be more consequential than unintended one?

Finally, there is the issue of generalizability. The categorization of transparency, ambiguity and opacity should be extremely useful for the analyses of transnational policies more broadly. Indeed, this is an important contribution to the literature that normally assumes that the law is transparent and rarely pays attention to intentional ambiguities or the function of contradictions in and across agreements. (As a side note, however, transparency according to *Fallout* is used to undermine the success of an international agreement, but one could consider cases in which transparency is demanded as a constructive rather than obstructive exercise). But what about the generalizability of the outcomes? *Fallout* gives little room for optimism regarding the success of international agreements. Readers of the book are likely to conclude that any international agreement that is somewhat conflictual is doomed to fail, independently of how they are written. In the cases analyzed in *Fallout*, transparency failed, ambiguity failed, and while opacity led to an agreement, this is hardly a preferred way for reaching agreements (constituents were lied to, after all, and parties found it easy to later manipulate the agreement). Should we expect similar results in other cases as well? Can we use this to predict, for example, the outcome of the current international environmental negotiations that, like the negotiations over nuclear non-proliferation, attempt to prevent an inevitable catastrophe? Is the fate of these agreements determined by the level of transparency, ambiguity or opacity? Should we hope for opacity since *Fallout* concludes that this is the most successful strategy for concluding agreement? Should we expect – independently of how it’s written – the outcome to be disappointing? Evidence to the success of the book is the fact that it makes us believe that the answer could be yes to all these questions.
Mallard’s contribution goes beyond IR theory: it is also an important contribution to the historical sociology of EU polity as much as to socio-legal studies. The book does not only bring a renewed understanding of “nuclear diplomacy in the post-WWII period”; it also suggests an interesting research agenda for the study of diplomatic practices. In particular, he provides a very original and quite sophisticated toolbox for analyzing what would seem to be, at first sight, a very classic and age-old theme of study, that of diplomacy, secrecy and treaty-making strategies.

As I am no specialist of nuclear policies, I will essentially point here at the innovative conceptual frame that Mallard has built to grasp the complex set of diplomatic, military and political practices in the domain of treaty-making. Drawing from interpretative sociology, Fallout suggests that treaty-making is best understood as a continuum of interpretative tactics and strategies that goes beyond the oft taken-for-granted disjuncture (“coupure”) between treaty-negotiation and treaty-implementation. The grand bargain of diplomacy does not just end up with the signing of nuclear treaties but it actually continues through competing hermeneutic strategies and tactics over the authentic meaning of the treaty and the degree to which this meaning should be public or not. Thereby, Mallard sheds a light on a completely new layer of analysis, one that has remained mostly in the shadow, so far, of the competing diplomatic attempts to preempt and secure control over what could be coined as an “hermeneutic space” of the treaties (established customs, shared understanding, ambiguities, and holes, etc) (Heinich and Brown 1996). To grasp the many possible interpretative arrangements in a systematic manner, Mallard suggests a two-by-two table (from publicity and, later, transparency, to secrecy on the one hand, and from clarity to ambiguity on the other hand), thereby sketching out four

References


Comments on Fallout

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Grégoire Mallard’s book reads like a personal (and fruitful) journey across academic fields. It’s not hard to find track of the variety of national and disciplinary encounters that have accompanied his eclectic intellectual trajectory from Paris to Harvard, and from Chicago to Geneva or Florence. While Fallout draws from a variety of influences in the fields of international relations (IR), historical sociology or socio-legal studies, it never fully embraces anyone of them. In that, he is part of a broader intellectual undertaking that brings a variety of French authors - Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and Bruno Latour - in closer contact with the field of European Union (EU) studies and IR. Interestingly, all these attempts converge in paying a renewed attention to social and professional practices, a focus that has been a dead angle of the fields’ controversies for quite a long time (Pouliot Forthcoming; Adler-Nissen 2014; Mudge and Vauchez 2012; Bigo and Madsen 2011). Yet
possible ideal-types with which to study international treaties.

With this innovative compass, the book reads like an exploration of the practical conditions of modern diplomacy. It may well be the case that we have finally our modern addition to The Prince!, one that is a sociologically - and historically - informed reflection on the relative

...nuclear treaties involve a rather simplified diplomatic game with very few relevant players - a handful of scientists, some military experts and a lot of diplomats. This is probably the reason why Fallout somehow underestimates legal interpretation and its relatively autonomous dynamics when it comes to making sense of international treaties.

costs and advantages of opacity, transparency and ambiguity in diplomatic practices. What can be gained from maintaining secret interpretations? What is the risk of transparency? What does it mean and imply to “clarify” the meaning of a treaty? The book explores all these questions and provides a renewed understanding of diplomats’ repertoire of possible tactics and counter-moves when it comes to securing interpretation and maintaining secrecy, both domestically and internationally (creating a parliamentary committee, consulting with the national supreme court, writing a protocole, etc.). As the book brings to the forefront diplomats’ skills and their pratical knowledge of the international game, it clearly is a must-read for all good diplomatic schools!

Yet, for all its worth, the book still raises a number of questions. The first one relates to the historicity of this conceptual framework built around notions such as secrecy/publicity and opacity/clarity. These concepts actually have a rich history of their own at the international level that goes back in the past, before the Cold War period. To fully grasp their changing normative underpinnings, it would be interesting to track how they were articulated into a new repertoire of diplomacy in the post-WWI period. In that respect, the League of Nations and the rise of multilateralism was a key moment. A new regime of publicity was shaped at the time, one that would tie together public negotiations, systematic registration of all international treaties before the League of Nations, their exhaustive publication in Official Treaty Series, their official “coming into force” and their actual legal value. Importantly, this new arrangement gave law and the international lawyer a new role as public garant of this new multilateral order against the return of secret diplomatic practices –and its alleged consequences (conflicts, wars). While this certainly did not prevent secret agreements to re-emerge,¹ the system of values was however being profoundly transformed, prompting continuing debates and controversies over the scope and legitimacy of secrecy.

My second remark questions the extent to which this framework can travel beyond the particular case of nuclear policy and may be generalized to other diplomatic fields. Nuclear policy is certainly a great case-study for Mallard’s purposes as it stands at the crossing between scientific research, diplomatic strategies and military power, all three sectors sharing traditions of secrecy. Yet, for these very reasons, this is a highly specific field. As the atom gets to the core of sovereignty and provides the ultimate tool of world hegemony in the context of the Cold War, it has become a matter of “high politics,” big stakes and grand strategies. As a result, nuclear treaties involve a rather simplified diplomatic game with very
few relevant players - a handful of scientists, some military experts and a lot of diplomats. This is probably the reason why *Fallout* somehow underestimates legal interpretation and its relatively autonomous dynamics when it comes to making sense of international treaties. Still, legal tactics have always provided a distinct layer of interpretative battles and an essential lever for strategies of concealment. Although the following sentence famously comes from an economist, Alan Greenspan, it could equally qualify for lawyers: “If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.” To be sure, this capacity to maintain forms of “clair-obscur” around treaties and international agreements has been one of lawyers’ most appreciated quality in the context of international relations! The entry into force of the long-negotiated Vienna convention on the law of the treaties in 1969 has actually recognized the specificity and the legitimacy of these legal battles, that in turn bring limits or deadlocks to the way diplomats can maneuver when it comes to securing the most suitable meaning for a particular treaty.

I do think *Fallout* offers a lasting theoretical framework to study contemporary diplomatic practices. For that reason, it would be interesting to question the extent to which we have now moved away from the rather simplified game of post-WWII nuclear policy negotiations with few diplomatic actors bound by inter-personal ties and a certain amount of control over the treaty-interpretation. In most areas of the diplomatic bargain, a large part of the interpretative dynamics take place outside the chancelleries. This is not to say that diplomats have lost all control over treaties’ meaning. However, they now form only one group among the many public and private actors involved in the international political process. As a matter of fact, securing the interpretation of a treaty has become a far more complex business. With the rise of an international “public sphere”, there are many more actors that have a vested interest in publicity and transparency of diplomatic practices – from scholars to NGOs. Just consider the ongoing controversy over the secrecy of the European Commission’s mandate in the transatlantic trade and investment treaty (TTIP): while the Commission has refused for a long time to disclose its negotiating mandate in the name of efficiency, it has proved impossible to maintain such a position in front of an increasingly wide front of NGOs that criticized the legitimacy of opaqueness given the importance and variety of interests at stake. This is proof to the fact that *Fallout* opens up a new research agenda –one that would question the new context of diplomacy and assess the changing value and risks of the different diplomatic tactics over the clarity and transparency of international norms.

Endnotes

1. Cf. Megan Donaldson’s ongoing Ph.D in history of international law at NYU: Renegotiating secrecy: the registration of treaty and international order between the wars, American Society of International Law Midyear research forum 2013, on file with the author.

2. This is particularly true for the Euratom treaty of 1957 governed by the emerging law of the European Communities, which has become a field of its own (Vauchez 2015).

References


Response to Critics

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Before I start, I must say how honored and privileged I feel to have received such insightful comments on Fallout. The comments deserve more attention that I can devote to them in such a limited space, but I will try to answer the most important ones, which touch upon three different aspects of Fallout: 1) the ontological status of my object of research; 2) my methodological approach, especially the relation between genealogy and comparison; 3) the transportability of my theory to the study of other transnational legal fields – to use Terrence Halliday and Greg Shaffer’s (2014) concept –, especially in the context of growing global openness between domestic public spheres.

Transparency, Ambiguity and Opacity: Textual Properties or Networks’ Organizational Structures?

Some commentators point to an ambiguity in the ontological status of that which I call either “transparent,” or “ambiguous,” or “opaque.” Is “opacity” the quality of a meaning-making strategy followed by a specific set of actors (diplomats, politicians, experts, etc.) to turn their preferred policy into law? Or is it a property of the texts themselves in which states’ commitments are sealed (treaties, conventions, etc.)? Nitsan Chorev remarks that Fallout somehow leaves the reader to wonder whether what is opaque or transparent is the text of the treaty, convention or pact in which statesmen and politicians seal their plan, or whether it is something else.

I would say it is something else, which I will explain further later, using language that is a bit different from that used in the book itself. Indeed, I first want to alert (future) readers of Fallout that, especially if they are formally trained in law or international law, they might “naturally” associate the terms “ambiguous” or “transparent” with the properties of the text itself (its sentences and propositions). They are not the only ones to do so: lawmakers also associate transparency with clearly written provisions, and they dislike textual ambiguity in bills, statutes or contracts. Even scholars of “legalization” (Abbott and Snidal 2000) and scholars of “legal recursivity” (Halliday and Carruthers 2007) share the same textual perspective in their study of the process by which ambiguous covenants are clarified and the interpretation of their provisions fixed by the accumulation of court judgments. For them, transparency and ambiguity are properties of the legal texts.

This is where Fallout innovates. I do not consider that it is the written sentence of a text that is transparent, ambiguous or opaque. I attach these adjectives to discourse rather than text: discourse about what the text says, e.g. interpretations found in transcripts of conversations, written commentaries published in law journals, in other words, all the text, sub-texts and accompanying texts that surround a treaty itself and embed its meaning in a network of interpretations. Thus, what I consider transparent, ambiguous or opaque is this network of interpretations, whose structuration is therefore qualified by one of these terms. Although it is not a term I have used, Antoine Vauchez uses the term “hermeneutic space” to describe the object
whose organizational structure I am describing, giving an interesting name to such a network of interpretations.

In fact, I propose a two-by-two table to distinguish between various types of networks of interpretations– two cells in the table correspond to two slightly different versions of opacity, which is why I end up with only 3 terms: transparency, ambiguity and opacity. The first dimension of the table distinguishes whether the interpretation of a text is open to one clear interpretation or to a multiplicity of meanings, and in so doing, it may give the impression that I could be talking about a textual property (and not about a property of the interpretations of the text). But the second dimension concerns whether the network in which these interpretations circulate is strongly split into a public front-stage and a private backstage, or whether the boundary between the two is porous and in some ways irrelevant. This second dimension indicates that I am not talking about textual clarity, ambiguity or opacity. Rather, I am talking about the structuration of a network of interpretations, which is sometimes transparent, sometimes ambiguous and sometimes opaque.

My main theoretical ambition in Fallout is therefore to explain the evolution of such networks of interpretations, by answering such questions as: How is opacity constructed? Thanks to which strategy? How does opacity evolve in reaction to certain shocks (like the renewal of the majority of members in the networks of interpreters, or attacks against the boundary between public and private interpretations by outsiders)? How can opacity be sustained over time? What is the effect of opacity on the interpretation of other overlapping treaties? Especially when the latter are embedded in ambiguous or transparent networks of interpretations?

In order to answer such questions, I selected a few cycles of treaty interpretation and re-interpretation to analyze. For instance, after showing how the network of interpretations that created ambiguity around Europe’s nuclear trade rules failed to yield the hoped-for results (chapter 4), I looked at how the erection of a strong boundary between public and private interpretations of the treaty instituting a European Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom) turned the ambiguity of Europe’s nuclear trade rules into opacity (chapter 5). I then showed how, with little textual amendment, such a boundary between public and private interpretations was successfully challenged by new political-legal elites in France and the US (chapter 6), which thus reduced the opacity of Europe’s nuclear trade rules and turned it into clarity. Fallout thus focuses on such dynamics within these networks of interpretations.

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Now, Antoine Vauche makes an excellent remark when he notes that my choice of words
for these types of network structuration is not neutral. “Transparency,” “ambiguity,” and “opacity” indeed have a long history, both in law and in moral philosophy. They mean certain things for diplomats and international law scholars and for the public at large, which might not correspond exactly to my understanding of these concepts – hence, the possibility of misinterpretation. Thus, by choosing to capture some of my concepts with terms coming from folk practice – concepts taken from “the field” – I may encourage international law scholars into thinking that I am talking about textual ambiguity when I am not. That is an excellent point, and indeed, is the drawback of my strategy, a drawback long noticed by sociological theorists, who have debated whether they should coin new terms (like “habitus” for instance, coming from Latin) to build sociological concepts; or whether they should infuse folk concepts with sociological meaning. Durkheim and Bourdieu chose to use sociological concepts (like “anomy”) whose names could not be confused with folk concepts, but they ran another risk: that these concepts may not relate at all with the experiential worlds of their readers not trained in sociology, thus artificially insulating sociology from broader political discursive fields. As I have preferred to use folk concepts and translate their meanings into sociological theoretical terms, I followed in the footsteps of the ethnographic tradition of the Chicago school, or the Goffmanian dramaturgical approach. For me, the advantage is that most international law practitioners immediately (or intuitively) get the idea behind transparency or opacity, even though they may slowly realize that I define them differently from their prior understanding. But at least they are given an anchor to tie this new sociological theory to their intuitive world.

Commentators make a second set of comments that relate to methods, and – it will come as no surprise to historical sociologists – these comments deal with the status of my comparative approach. Julia Adams in particular notices that *Fallout* mixes genealogical and comparative approaches, and asks for more explanation of how I relate the two, as historical sociologists most often see both approaches as quite separate (even if complementary) rather than as parts of one unified approach.

In fact, Julia Adams is right to point out that my approach to comparison is not orthodox in the eyes of a historical sociologist. To use Michael Burawoy’s (2009, chap 3) opposition, I will say that *Fallout* sides with “Trotsky” (a Trotsky turned into a comparative sociologist by Burawoy) rather than with Skocpol – and this is a heterodox position in historical and comparative sociology. Indeed, since Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol pioneered their comparative case-based approaches to national revolutions, historical sociologists have long established that small-n comparisons should respect the principle of independence between the cases – a methodological approach beautifully systematized by Charles Ragin (1989). My approach differs from theirs and relates to what Burawoy calls “Trotsky’s principles of comparison.” Here, I develop only one point of similarity for reasons of space, but Burawoy’s description captures in many respects how I relate my political/normative positioning with regard to the questions addressed in the book and with the construction of my object of research.

Indeed, in accordance with Burawoy’s approach to comparison, I do not consider that the cases I study – e.g. networks of interpretations about regional regimes of nuclear trade rules – are independent from one another. First, as I say in *Fallout*, the networks
of interpretation about overlapping trade rules (some regional, others global in scope) evolve in conjunction with one another, through processes of distinction, insulation or harmonization – a concept that is at the core of my narrative. Second, past successes and failures are taken into consideration by policymakers as they re-interpret some of the rules of various regimes. The particularity of world historical events is that they enter into our collective memory, albeit with many re-interpretations and modes of forgetting certain facets of the events, but still, the result of this memorialization process is that we cannot treat cases as independent from one another. Claiming that my “cases” are independent units would have been a plain fiction, only meant to assuage the anxieties of positivist methodologists.

Some historical sociologists have preferred to ignore this methodological problem and they have found various justifications. As they have focused on cross-national comparision, they claimed that they were thus able to hide their simplification of history (and their ignorance of transnational factors, which threaten such independence) behind the assumption that national histories (and their lessons) do not cross national boundaries. But as Burawoy writes, this is largely untrue. As far as world historical events – like for example the French, the Russian or the Maoist revolutions – are concerned, it is impossible to treat these cases as if they could be independent. Indeed, one big difference of the Maoist revolutionaries is that they have come after the Russian and the French revolutionaries, and that they have learnt to study past revolutionary sequences and draw some lessons from such study. The same is true of Lenin’s acolytes with respect to the French revolution. The same is true for nuclear nonproliferation treaty regimes. The failure and success of the first international attempts to govern nuclear trade has been analyzed by those who later tried to set new global and regional regimes to regulate nuclear trade. Thus, it becomes really hard to sustain the Skocpolian fiction of case-independence when one compares – as I do in Fallout – various transnational legal orders, which are essentially tying together many national histories, and whose normative status is hotly debated across regions.

Ron Levi makes an excellent remark when he says that future comparative research of transnational regimes should embed more than I do the study of their “foundational events” into the larger study of political emotions, as political emotions have the property of traveling very fast across national boundaries, thus tying together previously unrelated zones of the world. This is a well-taken point.

Thus, the specific dynamics of the networks of interpretations I study are embedded in a (though fragmented, still widely-encompassing) world history, and I did not treat the “cases” I followed as if they were different species of insects with no temporal relation between them. Here, they are embedded in a temporality that is full of recursive cycles and moments of disjuncture as well as moments of suturing. The recognition of this fact led me to construct the first part of Fallout in a way that is both uniquely comparative and genealogical. The three chapters in this first section compare three successive specific attempts at constructing a supranational nuclear trade regime: the rules developed in the first attempt were embedded in a network of interpretations that created transparency (chapter 3); the second attempt resulted in a network of interpretations that created ambiguity (chapter 4); and the third in an opaque network of interpretations (chapter 5), which was later challenged from within (chapter 6), and from outside (chapter 7). Each case can’t be treated as independent from the others, as the actors involved in the construction of each treaty regime learnt
lessons from the failure of the others, achieving success only on the third attempt.

Thus, the comparison between transparency, ambiguity and opacity that I develop in these three chapters is not purely comparative, nor is it purely genealogical, as I think that following this process – what some call “process-tracing” (Collier 2011) – can help us learn something about transparency, ambiguity and opacity from a comparative angle (even if they are placed in this temporal sequence). “Learning something” does not mean “testing” the impact of a variable – or factor, in a small-n cased-based comparison – by looking at how each factor plays out in independent cases, but rather it means becoming aware of the specific constraints that each interpretive structure may create for the actors playing the game.

I use the same approach in the last chapters, in which I compare how opacity resisted various external shocks: first, in the case of the opaque rules governing Europe’s nuclear production and trade (chapter 7), and second, in the case of the opaque rules governing nuclear trade with, respectively, Israel, India and Pakistan (chapter 8). In this last chapter, I thus take a long view of the dynamics of opacity and I look at how opacity has been differently affected by inter-generational change within domestic policy fields of the countries tied to the nuclear trade regimes in question, and by the pressures exerted by outside hegemons. This chapter explains how various dynamics lead to different outcomes: for instance, how domestic elites in these countries reacted to challenges by further obscuring the private meanings of their own program and its relationship to the rest of the world (Israel and Pakistan), or by openly challenging and exposing the West’s hypocrisy, and being fought against in turn (India). Here again, the cases are not independent, to the extent that the evolution of the opaque nuclear trade rules in Europe affected the evolution in India, or Israel, or Pakistan. Still, the comparative/genealogical approach brings lessons for both social science history and for policy debates.

In many ways, the comparison between Europe, Israel, India and Pakistan also undermines a “rationalist” reading of Fallout which is sometimes encouraged by my use of tables (see pp. 23 and 24 in chapter 2 especially), in which I list predictions about the long-term effects of transparency, ambiguity and opacity – as if these predictions could be separated from contextual factors. This rational action reading is certainly possible. As I have said, transparency, ambiguity and opacity refer to the structuration of networks of interpretations, but they are also the outcome of strategies. Then, one can read opacity as a strategy followed by rational actors to obtain specific outcomes – outcomes that are not context-dependent – when actors face certain constraints. This reading of Fallout could perfectly complement, as Julia Adams and Nitsan Chorev underline, the two-level game theory of Robert Putnam, which stresses that one of the main problems faced by diplomatic agents is that they have a multiplicity of principals (some domestic, others international), and that not all principals have the same interests and policy preferences. Then, opacity could be an efficient strategy, which, to the extent that it seeks to erect a strong boundary between various kinds of interpretations and various kinds of publics, could help agents solve their problem of multiple loyalties. This is a possible reading of Fallout, and I am sure some readers will look for such recipes in the book, if as Antoine Vauchez suggests, they read it as a modern-day adaptation of Machiavelli’s The Prince – a very generous comparison. But the comparison between the dynamics of opacity in Europe, Israel, India and Pakistan balances that possible reduction of opacity to a rational strategy, as it leads me to conclude that opacity
does not always have the same kind of effects on the dynamics of treaty interpretation.

The Relevance of Fallout in the Face of Global Changes

My commentators make a last wave of comments, which I will address very quickly for lack of space but not for lack of interest. Both Julia Adams and Ron Levi wonder whether the kind of opacity that I describe as being produced in the early days of the Cold War by a small transatlantic elite could still be possible in the digital age of Wikileaks, in which media diffusion of scoops, scandals, leaked documents and unofficial rumors is both instantaneous and global. I would answer by saying that while the structure of the global elite I am describing has changed since the early days of the Cold War, it does not mean that opacity is absent from the world of foreign policy and global governance.

We can turn to the initial reaction of the State Department right after the publication of State Department cables by Assange’s team to illustrate this point. The State Department reaction was very interesting and subtle: officials sent letters to the press (which were relayed by deans of major US universities) saying that anyone reading and citing leaked cables would jeopardize their employability as future federal government employees (LaFranchi 2010). The rationale was that doing so could have been interpreted by the future authorities in charge of delivering a security clearance to a future employee as a political message of support for Assange’s decision, rather than just the manifestation of legitimate intellectual and political curiosity for contemporary US foreign policy. This message was later denied, maybe for fear that someone in the future might be denied a job and sue the US government for undue discrimination (e.g. discrimination against people who exert their constitutionally protected right of free speech).

The denial itself was not official. Thanks to these mixed messages, the US government succeeded in leaving the impression that maybe reading public information on the web could be held against one’s employability (and security clearance). This was by all means a smart strategy, although we may question how legitimate it was. In many ways, it worked: even though the press amply commented upon the cables (not always smartly, as some

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favored the most sensational ones without considering possible security risks for diplomats stationed abroad), most US students of foreign policy still prefer not to read the cables, which means that scholars and their students have incorporated the fact that they are watched when they use the internet.

After reading about Edward Snowden’s revelations, and the US reaction to the Wikileaks disclosure, it seems to me that transparency is imposed upon the citizens of most democracies and authoritarian states, while the governments still keep opaque most of their activities. Even when leaks are published by the press, they remain neither public, nor classified, largely because governments refuse to acknowledge their authenticity and use the threat to deny employability and access to classified information as tools for policing the boundary between public and secret knowledge. This latter strategy is not new. After all, one of the earliest scandals of nuclear policy was the
decision, made by an internal board of the US Atomic Energy Commission, to revoke J. Robert Oppenheimer’s security clearance as, even though Los Alamos’ former director was not found to be disloyal, he was seen as a “security risk” for the new administration. The US government’s reaction to Wikileaks thus shows the long-lasting legacy of the institutions of classification, which have been especially entrenched in the world of nuclear policy.

As those practices of classification and opacification have proliferated in many other policy fields than nuclear policy, we can expect that the analysis of opacity I develop in Fallout could be extended to the study of many other transnational legal fields. For instance, one of the most important pieces of global legislation that, if adopted, is likely to change policymaking in the twentieth century - the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal - remains so secret that lawmakers can only access the text of the draft treaty in a secure room but cannot discuss it in public. This triggered Wikileaks’ decision to propose a $100,000 reward for whoever would leak the document to the press (McBridge 2015). In today’s world, it is not transparency but secrecy that is the rule, so that transparency is only too often the result of (criminalized) leaking practice. We should thank Peter Galison (2004) for reminding us that the size of the textual world classified by the US government since the Second World War amounts to a tenth (according to his estimate) of the size of the published textual world held in the Library of Congress. A few leakers and hackers may have endorsed the objective of challenging the opacity of governmental practice, either because they follow the ideals set by President Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points, or because they oppose specific policy decisions, or because they pursue darker goals. But in the end, their challenge remains relatively small. So far, both democracies and (to an even greater extent) authoritarian regimes have successfully managed to preserve (and sometimes augment) their ability to protect the opacity surrounding their international dealings, whether the latter concern trade negotiations, climate policy or human rights protection. I think that there is a great urgency for historical and comparative sociologists to expand their analyses of national-level dynamics to study these transnational processes, but whether the latter want to turn these dynamics into objects of study remains for the readers of Fallout to decide.

References


