he argues that in Turkey, the government of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) favored pro-business public policies, as a result of which inequality was a Gini coefficient of 0.41. However, he does not present the Gini coefficient for 2002 or earlier, before the party formed a government. Moreover, according to Turkish Statistical Institute reports, the Gini coefficient in Turkey decreased from 0.41 in 2008 to 0.40 in 2012. Andrain also misses the important fact that the AKP’s policies favoring the poor, such as increasing spending on education, health care, and social services, were the major reasons for its electoral victories in 2007 and 2011. These examples do not refute the main argument of the book but suggest that a deeper analysis would have been more convincing.

Andrain’s book is intended for a nonacademic audience, and it does a good job of communicating effectively with the reader. Indeed, it is especially innovative in its use of novels and the characters in them to illustrate its arguments. It highlights two dominant perspectives in the political economy literature and uses a comparative approach, which makes the book good reading for undergraduate public policy courses.

EKREM KARAKOC
Binghamton University


Diplomatic machinations to limit Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs command headlines. To make sense of why nuclear programs in these countries have proved to be so difficult to restrain, one could not do better than consult Grégoire Mallard’s thoughtful, analytic history of global nuclear diplomacy. *Fallout’s* strength lies in its ability to combine historical detail with conceptual clarity in order to bring diplomatic choices into focus. The book portrays law not just as something made by men and women in robes but also as a phenomenon that is constructed by how people talk about and use written laws and unwritten norms.

Mallard proposes a typology of interpretive maneuvers regarding the law: transparency, ambiguity, and opacity. A casual reader might think that these three concepts mean more or less the same thing or that all international laws are ambiguous. Mallard argues that the world is not so simple. He shows how diplomats can choose among these three approaches. Furthermore, there are reasons rooted in domestic politics why diplomats might favor transparency and opacity in law over ambiguity. Mallard defines opacity as the idea that
there “should be at least two truths, one for insiders and one for outsiders” (p. 25). Opacity is the realm of secret meetings and backroom deals.

The central drama of Fallout is the evolution of the United States’ initial support for European federalism to its more familiar Cold War position in which the United States vies with the Soviet Union for control over spheres of influence. Mallard’s larger theoretical point is that it is risky to pin ambitious hopes on a relatively obscure treaty that does not directly address European defense in relationship to the United States or even among European powers. If consensus about European federalism and defense rests on unspoken agreements and what Mallard terms opacity, then it comes at a “price.” That price is an opaque treaty’s potential for a new interpretation and new reality when used by the next generation of diplomats and politicians.

Mallard’s historical detective work, mining the archives of discussions around the Euratom Treaty, is masterful, and his writing is bright and at times thrilling. He is a distinctive scholar who blends attention to historical detail with careful consideration of concepts in what he describes as a Bourdieuean analysis. Mallard handles the theory so deftly that the book will appeal to readers from a wide range of fields. The final chapter is of particular interest to policymakers. It shows how opacity led to a greater danger from Pakistan’s nuclear networks than from the more widely covered exceptions to the nuclear nonproliferation regime in Israel and India.

The book opens up two avenues for further exploration. First, while Fallout focuses on diplomatic interpretations of the Euratom Treaty, its explanation relies on shifts in U.S. and French foreign policy, from the immediate postwar generation to the Cold War. It is worth exploring the sources of the United States’ and France’s shift away from support for Eurofederalism.

Second, Mallard coins the term “opacity” to describe treaties that have a public meaning, presumably one shared by many politicians and the press, as well as a private meaning that is known only to a small group of diplomats and politicians. The term was first used in international security by Avner Cohen to describe Israel’s policy of “opacity” about whether or not it possesses nuclear weapons. For Israel, opacity seems to be nonacknowledgment of a secret that everyone knows to be true: that Israel has nuclear weapons. It is not clear that opacity means the same thing for Mallard, who also describes the concept as the idea that there “should be at least two truths, one for insiders and one for outsiders” (p. 25). A better word for the phenomenon that Mallard describes might be esotericism, which is the subject of Arthur Melzer’s recent book Philosophy between the Lines. Intellectuals have long tried to communicate controversial or new ideas in subtle ways so as to avoid offending powerful patrons or risking persecution. Diplomatic opacity possesses something of this character.
Finally, Mallard’s excellent book contributes to scholarship in public administration and policy that offers an agential perspective on how institutions interact with policy. Diplomats and administrators have latitude to shape nuclear nonproliferation policy in their role as agents, and they are not wholly dependent on their traditional principals, who are elected politicians. Focusing on the role of diplomats and the men and women traditionally seen as agents of their political bosses allows scholars to better understand how nuclear policy has unfolded in a particular way over time, what paths were not taken, and how we might more consciously craft policy in the future.

PATRICK ROBERTS
Virginia Tech

Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations by Keren Yarhi-Milo. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2014. 360 pp. Cloth, $95.00; paper, $32.95.

This book examines one of the most important subjects in the study of international security: how leaders tend to assess the long-run intentions of adversaries. Keren Yarhi-Milo develops and tests a novel framework for explaining this process, which she labels the “selective attention thesis.” The argument combines core insights from psychological and organizational theories of perception. To Yarhi-Milo, political leaders and members of intelligence organizations will tend to privilege very different factors in their efforts to anticipate others’ international objectives.

Yarhi-Milo asserts that political leaders will tend to rely on two types of information in the intention-assessment process: information that is particularly vivid (created most prominently from private, face-to-face interactions with other leaders) and information that supports elites’ preconceived notions about the nature of the adversary (the most important preconception is whether leaders possess hardline or more accommodating views of rivals). Members of intelligence communities, in contrast, will tend to pay attention to more objective factors in assessing rivals’ international intentions. To these individuals, organizational context is the key determinant in judging objectives. Because the preeminent goal of intelligence agencies is to prevent a surprise attack, the surest way of realizing this organizational objective is to concentrate on adversaries’ military capabilities and what they can do in assessing what they will do.

Yarhi-Milo tests the predictions of her argument against realist and rationalist alternatives by examining thousands of pages of evidence, mostly from internal governmental and private sources, for three key cases: Great Britain’s